Security dilemma and nuclear Energy

Essay 1

Security dilemma, the inability of states to increase their security without threatening the security of others, is a fundamental driver of international policy since ancient times. It refers to a vicious interaction whereby measures that a state adopts to increases its security are a threat to others who, as a result take defensive mechanism, which in turn reduce the sense of security of the first state. Security dilemma arises from the anarchist nature of the state system. Without a superior power to protect it, each country state bears the responsibility for its security, for its survival, as a member of the state system. States have an overwhelming responsibility, and attempt to expand their power. The security dilemma plays a critical role in understanding nuclear weapon programs. A nuclear program creates a window of opportunities and vulnerability for aggression from other states in the system. States feel threatened by proliferating states that pursue nuclear weapons status because; the weapons will alter the balance of the bargaining power between the proliferators and their potential opponents (Stulberg & Tuhrmann, 2013). Therefore, as states attempt to acquire nuclear weapons capabilities to increase their security, they threaten the security of others. The core means through nuclear weapons enhance an actor’s ability to secure better bargain is through their deterrence potential (Lowther, 2010). Although nuclear weapons are for offensive purposes, most countries view them in terms of deterrence. Therefore, they are strategy security dilemma. Often, confrontations such as India-Pakistan, East-West, and Arab-Israel are security dilemma. The American campaigns in Afghanistan against terrorist groups ignited the longstanding border tension between India and Pakistan. India and Pakistan have fought numerous wars. For example, Pakistan-backed tribesmen fought India Kashmir province (1947), and India retaliated by launching an offense against the Punjab province and later succession of the Bangladesh. In May 1998, India tested five nuclear devices, and Pakistan countered by detonating six devices to show their readiness to retaliate.

Realist theirs view international arena as a competitive stage where the main currency is power. The offensive realism postulates that states incline to maximize power as opposed to defensive realism that argues that states seek on “appropriate” amount of power. The theory makes five key assumptions about states. First, it assumes that the international system is anarchic because there is no Leviathan to protect states. Secondly, they argue that states always possess an offensive ability that enables them to hurt and destroy one another. Thirdly, international relation occurs in existential conditions of uncertainty. Therefore, there is not state that is sure its rivals will not attack it any given time. Fourth, survival is the core goal of all sovereign countries. Fifth, it assumes that states are rational actors that seek strategies to survive.

The theory posits that these assumptions induce an irreducible fear among states and instill a sense of incentives to maximize their power. Consequently, state clash with each in their quest for power. The act in the self-help system where states believes that the only way to ensure survival is to gain power at the expense of their rival that inevitably amount to “ceaseless security competition” for survival. The expectation of realism is that state value security above all else and make decisions by utilitarian cost-benefit calculations. Neorealist posits that since regimes have little independent power, states were resources by funneling inherently ineffectual efforts to them (Rublee, 2011). In a self-help world, alliances and agreements cannot form the basis of state security. Therefore, nuclear weapons are the ultimate tool for offense and defense and should be a prized part of a national security. Realists argue that the state seeks to acquire nuclear weapons to balance threat from potential adversaries. Therefore, states without potential adversaries will not seek to acquire a nuclear weapon.

However, the existence of uncertainty in international relation is under scrutiny. According to the offensive realist, uncertainty compels states to assume the worst scenario about the intentions of the rivals, which implies to harm them in a self-help system. However, there is no inherent reason to attack each others. Anarchy and uncertainty are obvious components of international relation and can do effectively explain variations in the international arena. The condition of uncertainty makes intentions of others unknown and because decision-making is based on measurable and determinable offensive capabilities. It is not a fact that the use of offensive capabilities will lead to security competition. Offensive realism postulates that when the assumptions exist, an irreducible fear makes the states act aggressively toward each other. Despite the realism theory positing that fear drives countries to act aggressively. It is not part of the five assumptions of the theory. Despite these shortcomings, realist postulation of security of the security dilemma is true to some extent. Security dilemma is a core offensive realism. As highlighted above, the security dilemma is the situation where states take measures to feel secure consecutively increasing the insecurity of other states? In his 1950 article, “Idealist Internationalism and the security Dilemma. Hertz states”

Striving to attain security from attacks (countries) are driven to acquire more power in order to escape the impacts of the power of other states. The act renders the other state more state insecure and compels it to prepare for the worst. Since none state can feel entirely secure, power competition ensues and a vicious circle of security and accumulation of power starts.

The concept of “security dilemma sensibility” is the ability of policy makers to identify and understand motives and show responsiveness toward potential military intentions of others. It is the ability to understand the role fear plays in attitudes and behavior and the role of provoking fear. When countries have security dilemma sensibility, they enter into the counter-fear of other states, understanding their military posture will contribute fear to other countries.

 Essay 2

Deterrence is about convincing an adversary to not do something undesirable. The Department of Defense defines deterrence as “preventing from action by fear of consequences. Therefore, deterrence is the state of mind about possible threat of an unacceptable counteraction. It focuses on achieving a specific psychological effect that causes and adversary to change a certain behavior. The key components of deterrence include capability and credibility, and the success of the policy depends on the ability of one actor to convince the other that changing the status quo presents numerous risks that outweigh potential benefits. Although deterrence formed part of international relation after the Second World War, it has been part of human history. The current model of deterrence includes deterrence by dissuasion, denial, and threat. Deterrence by dissuasion is the most passive component of deterrence, and it includes acts such as influencing public opinion, public diplomacy or propaganda. Dissuasion does not include violence of punitive action. Deterrence by denial aims at denying the target or adversary a certain objective through defensive measures. The components entail increasing the risks a target must accept to achieve a specific objective and to reduce the chance of achieving the objectives. Deterrence by threat includes the use of a specific threat that can range from low to the high end of the conflict. Threat includes punitive measures such as diplomatic and economic sanctions. The effectiveness of threat relies on the ability to convince the target the threat pose greater costs than the reward of altering status quo. None-state actors include peaceful and hostile none-state actors. Violent non-state actors are the major targets of deterrence. They include international criminal organizations, terrorist groups and insurgence. The construct of deterrence policy are not obsolete, but the underlying assumptions have changed dramatically since the Cold War in regard to threats.

The rise of terrorism in post-Cold War era is marked by an increase in violence toward non-military targets, such as civilians. Terrorism experts note that nuclear weapons especially lend themselves to this purpose. Once terrorist groups acquire a weapon, deterring its use is highly problematic. Therefore, the most promising deterrence policy to focuses on preventing the acquisition of a device or the nuclear material. Terrorist's groups have to overcome numerous obstacles before acquiring such a weapon or the ability to acquire the materials and the ability to deploy the weapon. These terrorist groups need to acquire fissile materials such as highly enriched uranium from a nuclear state (Pashakhanlou, 2013). They might also steal the materials from insecure stockpiles. Such probabilities are low with international cooperation. However, it is clear that nuclear weapons are not weapon of choice of most of the non-state actors and deterrence may not serve the purpose of reducing proliferation of the nuclear weapon to non-nuclear. For example, the USA applies threat and dissuasion strategies against Iran without success. Despite Russia having the largest stockpile of the nuclear weapon, it was possible for terrorists to blow up Moscow subways. Therefore, in the fight against non-state actors, nuclear deterrence has little or no meaning. Deterrence against shadowy terrorist networks that have not nation or citizen to defend is complex. On the other hand, containment is impossible when unbalanced dictators that have weapons of mass destruction can deliver the nuclear weapons to terrorist allies.

The concept of deterrence as it applies today is odd but not completely. The underlying use of deterrence during the Second World War and Cold War was to deter attacks from adversaries. The purpose of the policy was to overcome the problem of the Cold war. For example, by arming the UK with submarine with nuclear warheads, UK sought to deter Russia from launching such an attack. However, in this era where major threats are no longer from a single nuclear-armed state but terrorists and insurgents, such weapons and strategies are almost obsolete. Another example is French. French has four nuclear-armed submarines and airplanes. The Cold War reasoning for such as a General de Gaulle best describes the act. He states “within ten years, and we shall can 80 million Russians. I truly believe that one does not attack people who can kill 80 million Russians.”

The statement is absurd in the current arrangement despite French insisting on preserving the weapons to retaliate against terrorist states. However, French has been hit by terrorists several times but there has not been a nuclear retaliation.

There are several cases where deterrence has been effective. In 2000s, there has been a wave of terrorists attacks in India most from terrorists and insurgents from Pakistan. The presence of nuclear weapon deters inter-state conflicts between the two countries. According to Tavikasta (2010), Pakistan poses a two-fold threat to India. First, the nuclear security issues in Pakistan are inadequate, and it is possible for the numerous terrorist groups to steal or access the weapons. Secondly, the Pakistan government is a suspect of nuclear weapon proliferation. India feels that Pakistan can pass on nuclear know-how and materials to proxy actors. However, instead of the deterrence working to reduce nuclear weapons, the two countries are in a race constructing nuclear weapons. Another case for nuclear deterrence is Israel. Israel is the largest nuclear –state in Middle East. Israel has over two hundred, which according to security experts acts as a deterrence to its adversaries in the Middle East.

In confronting nuclear terrorism, the key assumption is that rogue countries and dictators van provide these weapons the terrorist groups. Sympathetic countries can provide nuclear making materials. For example, North Korea threatened to sell plutonium to the highest bidder in 2003 (Lévesque, 2007).
Nuclear deterrence may fail because Actors operate within strategic environments where information and suboptimal choices are the characteristics of decision making. Scholars suggest that decision makers operate within frameworks of bounded rationality where variables including fear, stress, exhaustion and imperfect information are common. Decision makers view adversaries differently from who they are due to the importance of cultural, historical, political and linguistic or religious differences. The balance inherent in a mutual deterrence framework is precarious. Each side of the bargaining power need to build the capacity to attack the other first and the capability to attack second. That is, and it must can retaliate.

In conclusion, the rise of non-state actors represents a historically unique security problem. Especially given the near impossibility of developing effective state-based deterrence strategies against such opponents. In fact, the rise of non-state actors is unquestionably the most serious security threat facing the current and future security environment. Achieving deterrence require leaders and citizens on a range of issues starting with a clearer understanding of existing and emerging threats. There is a movement toward non-nuclear means of deterrence to effectively prevent conflict and increase the stability. The USA and other states need to change their deterrence programs and policies. Nations can begin to move toward a safer and stable form of deterrence, greater cooperation, transparency, and verifications. Ensuring nuclear materials are protected one of the greatest way to reduce the proliferation of nuclear weapons to non-state actors.

 Part 2

The Arab spring’s democracy movement should not be welcomed because: different policies, shifts in power, violence uprisings
1.  The authoritarian power has shifted from an individual or the president to institutions. Militaries and other armed group have infiltrated the leadership systems in most of the countries.

In almost all the countries that have experienced the uprising, the leadership of the countries today are under military or are experiencing sectarian movements.

 Since the overthrow of Hussein Mubarak, Egypt have held two elections and referendums yet the military remain behind the scenes. In addition, the current constitution gives military courts the right to prosecute civilians and imposes stringent restrictions on protests. The Egypt’s Supreme Council of the Armed Forces is shielding power in a way to suggest it can only relinquish it reluctantly.

The current elections in Syria are taking place amid civil wars. The country is still under one-party rule and with no potential challenger to Assad, he is likely to win. In addition, the regions under the control of the national government have no differences with 2011.

After the death of Muammar Gaddafi, Libya had free elections in 2012. However, the existing institutions and infrastructures of leadership are not strong enough to repel the activities of the militias. The current conflicts between the central authority and armed militias threaten any prospect democracy.

 The aftermath of most uprising is the civil war. Libya, Egypt, and Syria are all in the verge of civil war.

 The governance scores of these countries are below the pre-uprising period. Libya, Syria and Egypt oppressive internal security policies and failure to deliver public foods effectively to the citizens fuelled the 2011 spring and explained who most of the citizens are still demonstrating.

 In Syria, the conflict persists since 2011 with thousands of civilians closing their lives. The western powers have left the local and regional forces to solve the crisis and resolution or peace is not in the near future.

2.  The high expectations about democracy in these countries were unrealistic.

The country’s political, social and economic infrastructures were not ready for the revolt. Therefore, eliminating the autocratic leadership will most likely be a hard and long process. There is a need to reform the public education systems and replacement of the culture of rote learning to facilitate national dialog and debates. In addition, religion was a major factor in mobilizing the social movements. However, an analysis of the history and culture of the countries offer a nuanced understanding of the motivation of the uprising. The previous regimes had created a military culture

The question of identity overshadowed the economic and social grievances of the society. The foundation of most of the countries was still in doubt, and the uprising only made the question complex to answer. There is no consensus on the meaning and purpose of the modern state and the role of religion and military in political life. Therefore, a large number of “liberals” and democrats embrace the military rule.

There are numerous internal and most importantly external factors that affect the democratization process. One of the factors is the presence of systems and institutions. These institutions are missing in most of these countries.

3. Rebuttal facts

The uprising plays a critical role in the democratization of Arab countries.

The mobilization of people during the uprising forms a strong foundation in the movement toward democracy.

The sheer shift of power from the authoritarian government to the people is an indication of increasing participation in the political process.

In Tunisia, there is a success transition to a democratic government.

In addition, democratization is a long process, and there is the need to give these countries more time.

Rhetorical questions

Should have democracy the Mubarak way or the military way?

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Carolyn Morgan is the author of this paper. A senior editor at MeldaResearch.Com in custom research paper services. If you need a similar paper you can place your order from urgent essay writing service.